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THE STAGE OF PUBLICATION AS A
"FAIR USE" FACTOR: HARPER & ROW,
PUBLISHERS, INC. V. NATION
ENTERPRISES
Federal copyright laws' are designed to promote the general
welfare by encouraging the creation and dissemination of new
ideas.2 By granting authors "exclusive rights" to reproduce their
work and prepare derivative works, these laws ensure that authors
have an economic incentive to create new works.3 The doctrine of
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The concept of copyright originated in mid-sixteenth
century England when a group of leading publishers attempted to silence the Protestant
Reformation by controlling the printing industry. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VMW OF COPY-
RIGHT 2-7 (1967); A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (5th ed. 1979); see L. PATrERsON, Copy-
RIGHT IN HISTORiCAL PERSPECTrvE 28-30 (1968); F. SKoN JAMEs & E. SKONE JAMES, Cop-
INGER AND SKONE JAMES ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 5-10 (9th ed. 1958). The first federal
copyright law in the United States, Act of May 31, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), was based
upon the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710), which secured an author's exclusive right to
reprint his books for a 14-year period and for an additional term if the author were alive at
termination of the original term. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
16-17 (1944); L. PATFERSON, supra, at 3, 7, 143-46; see also H. BALL, supra, at 30-32 (state
copyright acts predate federal legislation); L. PATrERSON, supra, at 183-92 (same).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress was granted the power to enact copyright
legislation "ft]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." Id. The primary purpose of the copyright laws was not always clear. L. PATTERSON,
supra note 1, at 181-82. Four general purposes of copyrighting have been advanced-to en-
hance learning, to prevent monopolies, to provide order in the book trade, and to secure the
author's right to his literary work. Id. at 181. Gradually, however, it has become recognized
that the main purpose of the copyright laws is to encourage artistic production. See Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts.'" Id.; see also Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (ambiguity of copyright statutes caused by techno-
logical change must be resolved in light of ultimate aim to promote general welfare); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (primary object of copyright system is to
ensure public benefits derived from the labors of authors).
3 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides that:
[t]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following.
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
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"fair use," by allowing reasonable unauthorized uses of copyrighted
material,4 balances this need to provide economic incentives to the
author against the public's interest in the free dissemination of in-
formation.5 In making fair use determinations, courts are given
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
Id. A violation of any of these exclusive rights constitutes a copyright infringement. 17
U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
" The concept of fair use was recognized in England as early as 1740, see Gyles v. Wil-
cox, 2 Atk. 141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740), and in America by 1844, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). However, no precise definition of the doc-
trine has emerged. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. The most widely quoted
definition is "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright, to use the copyright
material in a reasonable manner without his consent; notwithstanding the monopoly granted
to the owner by the copyright." SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., Fair
Use of Copyrighted Works, COPYRIGHT LAW REvIsION 5 (Comm. Print 1960) (Study No. 14
by Alan Latman) [hereinafter cited as Study No. 14] (quoting H. BALL, supra note 1, at
260); see Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 45-
46 (1955). The fair use concept is tailored to effectuate the copyright clause in the constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966) ("fundamental justification for the privilege lies in the constitutional purpose in
granting copyright protection in the first instance"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Ber-
lin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.) (copyright holder's interest inci-
dent to general constitutional objective), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350, 1362-63 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (federal non-profit
institution not infringing since photocopying of medical articles necessary to advance medi-
cal field); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966)
(biographer of Howard Hughes who extracted portions from magazine articles not guilty
since publication may encourage development of historical works), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp.
957, 960-61 (D.N.H. 1978) (use of opponent's campaign song in gubernatorial race permissi-
ble considering strong desire for free discussion of governmental affairs and political elec-
tions); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (slight
injury to copyright holder subordinated to public interest in information on Kennedy assas-
sination); L. SELTZER, ExEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 31 (1978).
In a seminal work, Professor Chafee stated: "The world goes ahead because each of us
builds on the work of our predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see
farther than the giant himself." Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 503, 511 (1945); see also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 4,436) (few books, even in antiquity, are truly "new and original"); Cohen, supra note
4, at 49 (some dependence on past works cannot be deemed infringement). Many commen-
tators have recognized that the fair use doctrine plays an important role in disseminating
information. See, e.g., Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation
of Facts, 76 HARv. L. R-v. 1569, 1604-05 (1963); Kramer, Foreword to Symposium on Liter-
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statutory guidance in section 107 of the Copyrights Act of 1976
(the Act).' Nevertheless, the applicability of the statute to unpub-
lished works remains unclear.7 Recently, however, in Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,8 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, applying the fair use doctrine, held that
portions of an unpublished, copyrighted manuscript may be copied
and published in a news magazine even though it is known that the
ary and Artistic Products-Copyright Problems, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140
(1954); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 No-
TRE DAMP LAW. 790, 801-04 (1975). The societal interest in allowing certain borrowings,
however, limits the economic protection afforded authors. Leavens, In Defense of the Unau-
thorized Use: Recent Developments in Defending Copyright Infringement, 44 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, 3, at 3. Permission to use excerpts from another's work was
intended "to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 1354.1 (1983) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Note, Fair Use: A
Controversial Topic in the Latest Revision of Our Copyright Law, 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 73, 78
(1965) (effectuating constitutional objective of copyright is "most accepted justification" for
fair use); see supra note 2; infra note 44.
6 Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982)). The fair use statute reads:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). This section, along with most of the Copyrights Act of 1976, became
effective January 1, 1978. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976). The 1976
revision was designed to reflect the drastic changes in technology that occurred since the
last revision in 1909. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD NEws at 5660.
7 See Goodale, Mr. Ford and The Nation: A Test of 'Fair Use' & the 1st Amendment,
NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1980, at 23, col. 2. Mr. Goodale questioned whether the fair use doctrine
applies to unpublished copyrighted works and if its application should be limited by analogy
to the protection afforded prior to the 1976 Act. Id. at 23, col. 3; see infra note 39 and
accompanying text; see also Copyright and Privacy Protection of Unpublished Works-
The Author's Dilemma, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 351, 377 (1977) (scope of fair use
unclear with regard to unpublished works) [hereinafter cited as Unpublished Works].
8 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
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entire work is on the verge of publication."
In Harper & Row, President Ford gave exclusive rights .to
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., and The Reader's Digest Associa-
tion (Harper & Row) to publish his then unwritten memoirs. 10
When the manuscript was near completion, Harper & Row sold ex-
clusive serialization rights to Time magazine."" Subsequently, how-
ever, an unidentified person gave an unauthorized copy of the
manuscript to the editor of The Nation, a weekly magazine de-
voted to political news and commentary. 2 Just two weeks before
Time was to publish selected segments, The Nation published an
article that relied almost exclusively upon the memoirs as source
material.'3 In light of this article, Time made a request to publish
the excerpts a week earlier than scheduled. Harper & Row refused
and Time ultimately did not publish any part of the manuscript,
declining to pay the balance due under the license. 4 Harper &
Row then filed suit against The Nation for copyright infringement
and various state law violations. 5 The district court rejected The
Nation's fair use defense and upheld Harper & Row's infringement
claim.' 6
On appeal, a divided Second Circuit panel reversed.'7 Writing
9 Id. at 208.
10 Id. at 197. The memoirs, entitled "A Time To Heal," were to discuss the circum-
stances surrounding the pardon of former President Nixon. Id. Under the contract, Presi-
dent Ford was obliged to avoid public discussion of unique material contained in the
memoirs to protect the value of the publication rights. Id. at 197-98.
1 Id. at 198. Time paid $12,500 in advance for the right to print pre-publication ex-
cerpts, and agreed to pay an additional $12,500 when the edition containing the excerpts
was completed. Id.
12 Id. at 198. Although the editor of The Nation testified that he neither solicited nor
paid for the manuscript, he was aware that his temporary possession had not been author-
ized by the publishers. Id.
13 Id. The Nation's reliance upon the manuscript has been estimated at 83%-1,870
words of the 2,250 contained in the article were copied or closely paraphrased from the
unpublished manuscript. See Appellee's Answering Brief at 12-13. The article is reprinted in
the appendix of the court's opinion. See 723 F.2d at 209-12.
14 Id. at 199. On the day The Nation article appeared, Time requested permission to
advance the scheduled publication date. Id. Harper & Row refused since it carefully
planned the serialization date to coincide with the release of the book. Id.
"' 723 F.2d at 199. The district court ruled that claims of conversion and tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations under state law were preempted by federal copyright law.
Id.; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 851-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982); infra note 17.
Is Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
1.7 723 F.2d at 197, 208. Judge Kaufman wrote the majority opinion in which Judge
Pierce joined. Judge Meskill filed a separate dissenting opinion. The court dismissed the
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for the court, Judge Kaufman noted that copyright laws protect
only an author's expression, not ideas or facts.1 8 The "state of
mind" of a former President, the majority reasoned, was no less
fact than were any of his actions. 19 Therefore, the majority deter-
mined that much of the appropriated material was not copyright-
able in the first place.20 The court emphasized that the public has
a significant interest in "the most important details of our nation's
historical and political life."'21 Yet, rather than hold that overriding
first amendment considerations precluded the need for a stringent
copyright analysis, the court applied a fair use test.22 Applying the
statutory fair use criteria,23 the court concluded that The Nation
article was designed to benefit the public,24 was necessary to lend
authenticity to a news report,25 and had caused economic harm
that, at most, could be characterized as "dubious."2
In a persuasive dissent, Judge Meskill asserted that the major-
conversion claim concluding that a "temporary interference" does not amount to a "com-
plete exclusion of the rightful possessor," 723 F.2d at 201, and affirmed the district court's
ruling on preemption of the claim of tortious interference with contractual relations. Id. The
court determined that the legal rights in question are preserved by the copyright laws and
therefore are preempted pursuant to § 301 of the 1976 Act. Id.; see infra note 36 and accom-
panying text.
18 723 F.2d at 202; see infra note 52.
19 723 F.2d at 204-05.
20 See 723 F.2d at 206. The majority determined that no more than 300 words used in
The Nation article were copyrightable. Id. The court refused to grant any protection to
sections that were merely paraphrased. Id. at 203. In addition, the court noted that some of
the information concerning the Nixon pardon had been presented by President Ford before
the Hungate Committee and therefore was not copyrightable under the government work
exemption. 723 F.2d at 205; see Pardon of Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. at 90-151 (1974); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105 (1982). Lastly, the court stated that
conversations attributable to others cannot gain copyright protection since 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) requires that the author's work be created by him. 723 F.2d at 205.
21 723 F.2d at 205; see id. at 197 (copyright laws should not "impede that harvest of
knowledge so necessary to a democratic state"); id. at 208 (court's holding necessitated by
"values of free expression"); id. (court guided by "conviction that the statute not meant to
obstruct citizen's access to vital facts"); id. at 209 (copyright laws not intended to "chill the
activities of the press").
22 Id. at 206-08.
23 See supra note 6.
24 723 F.2d at 208. The court determined that when the use of copyrighted material is
beneficial to the public it is irrelevant that personal profit is involved. Id.
28 Id. The court noted that the quotations were informative and insubstantial in light
of the purpose of the article, which was to report news of a factual nature. See id. Thus, the
court held that the borrowed expression did not "supersede the use of the original work."
See id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
268 723 F.2d at 208; see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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ity had misapplied the copyright laws to bolster the freedom of the
press. The dissent contended that the memoirs deserved full cop-
yright protection as "expressions" of President Ford's "state of
mind."2" The case law relied upon by the majority was distin-
guished in Judge Meskill's opinion by observing that The Nation
article was of "trivial originality. ' 29 In addition, Judge Meskill ar-
gued that the majority's holding was not necessary to protect the
public's access to information since the material would have been
published, and therefore would have been available to the public,
without the unauthorized use.3 0
Inherent tension between the first amendment and the law of
copyright has been noted frequently.31 Rather than dwell on the
need for a separate first amendment defense to copyright infringe-
ment, this Comment will focus on the basis of the court's holding
in Harper & Row and will suggest a more equitable approach to
the fair use doctrine. It is submitted that in its fair use analysis,
the Harper & Row court failed to give appropriate weight to the
fact that the copyrighted work in question was about to be pub-
lished. In so doing, it is suggested, the court undermined goals
common to both the first amendment and the fair use doctrine.
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND THE UNPUBLISHED WORK
At common law, the author of an unpublished work had a
27 723 F.2d at 212 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
18 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the material should have been
protected from paraphrasing as well as from verbatim copying even assuming it was factual
in nature. Id. at 213 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 214 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The two cases distinguished by the dissent were
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980) and Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Judge Meskill noted that, in Hoehling and Rosemont Enter-
prises, the defendants had produced original accounts accompanied by independent re-
search, 723 F.2d at 214 (Meskill, J., dissenting), whereas The Nation's exclusive reliance
upon the copyrighted work constituted mere "'chiseling for personal profit.'" Id. at 216
(Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978)).
30 723 F.2d at 216 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
'" See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protection of Expression, 67 CALip. L. REv. 283, 284 (1979); Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 984 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1180
(1970); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm, 19 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 61 (1969).
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right of "first publication,"32 a right that was protected like any
other property right.3 3 In contrast, federal statutory copyright pro-
tection traditionally was afforded only to published works, 4 since
the system was designed primarily to reward only those who re-
32 See Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904); Es-
tate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1968); Hutchinson, Section 2 of The Copyright Act: A Statutory Maver-
ick, 19 COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 143, 151-54 (1971). The right of first publication in-
cluded the rights to publish as one saw fit and to prevent others from doing the same. Id. at
151. It has been suggested that the right to prevent the publication of one's work is a con-
comitant of the right of free speech, namely, the freedom not to speak publicly. See Schnap-
per v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Estate of
Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 348, 244 N.E.2d at 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 778; SENATE COMM!. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., Protection of Unpublished Works, COPYRIGHT LAW
REvisION 49 (Comm. Print 1961) (Study No. 29 by W. Straus) (statement of Irwin Karp)
[hereinafter cited as Study No. 29].
33 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908); Frohman v. Ferris, 238 ]MI.
430, 435-36, 87 N.E. 327, 328 (1909), aff'd, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); Study No. 29, supra note 32,
at 3-4. The common-law right of first publication included protection in perpetuity, unless,
of course, the work was published. 1 M. NImmER, supra note 5, § 4.03, at 4-15 to 4-16.
Study No. 29, supra note 32, at 1; 1 M. NImMER, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-16. Prior
to the 1976 revision of the copyright laws, the owner of an unpublished work had to rely on
common-law protection, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, or sometimes state
law, see, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 980(a) (West 1982), however, the owner could gain statutory
protection by registering his unpublished work with the copyright office, 17 U.S.C. § 408
(1982), or by publishing the work with the notice of copyright affixed thereto, id. § 401. As a
result of either act, common law protection would be forfeited. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908) (publication); Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social
Uplift Film Corp., 220 F. 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1915) (registration). Thus, the Copyright Act of
1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, provided for a dual system of copyright protection in which
common-law and statutory protection could not coexist. See Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at
347; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1101 n.13 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1983);
HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5745; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (constitution did not grant
federal government exclusive control of copyrights). However, statutory protection by regis-
tration was not available "to unpublished works in the classes of books, periodicals, maps,
reproductions of works of arts, and prints." Study No. 29, supra note 32, at 7. Therefore,
defining "publication" was crucial for most works to determine the type of protection to
which a copyright holder was entitled. Id. at 8-15; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 113
(1975). The publication concept has troubled the courts as the definition varies depending
upon the nature of the work and the context in which the term is used. See Roy Export Co.,
672 F.2d at 1101; Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1975); H.
BALL, supra note 1, at 132; Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at 356-57 & n.35. In Bartok,
the Second Circuit adopted Professor Nimmer's definition of publication as the time "when
by consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are ... made
available to the general public." 523 F.2d at 945. Today, the publication concept has lost
much of its former significance since federal copyright protection begins when the original
work is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); see infra
note 37 and accompanying text.
19841
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
vealed their work to the public.3 5 This federal statutory system was
altered when the copyright laws were unified in 1976.6 Pursuant to
the Copyright Act of 1976, common-law remedies previously avail-
able to the unpublished author were preempted, 7 except those
common-law rights not "equivalent" to those protected by the fed-
eral statute.3 8 For the first time, the author of an unpublished
work was afforded statutory protection upon creation. 9 Ironically,
however, if the fair use doctrine is rigidly applied to soon-to-be-
published works, the Act, while ostensibly broadening statutory
coverage, will serve to deprive the author of an unpublished work
of rights that are truly necessary for complete copyright protec-
tion.40 It is suggested that such a deprivation was not contem-
31 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Hutchinson, supra note 32, at 181; Unpub-
lished Works, supra note 7, at 369.
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
' See id. The Copyright Act of 1976 abrogated common-law protection for copyright-
able subject matter provided that the protection afforded by non-federal law is "equivalent"
to the rights granted by the 1976 Act. See id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 130, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5746.
- 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982). The section provides that "[n]othing in this title annuls or
limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State. .. ." Id.
39 See id. § 102(a) (protection exists for material "fixed in any tangible medium"). This
includes works "whether published or unpublished." Id. § 301; see HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 130-31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5746. Nevertheless,
registration of the copyrighted material is required pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982)
before an infringement suit may be instituted. See id. § 411; id. § 412 (registration required
to recover statutory damages and attorneys fees). Another advantage of registering the work
is that the registration serves prima facie evidence of valid copyright. Id. § 410(c).
40 In the process of drafting the 1976 Act, the Register of Copyrights recognized the
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protection of undisseminated works un-
til the author or his successor chooses to disclose them," REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961) [here-
inafter cited as REGISTER'S REPORT], thus acknowledging the need to protect an author's
prepublication rights in the event of federal preemption. However, it was unclear prior to
the 1976 Act whether the fair use doctrine should be applied to works protected at common
law. In 1969, the New York Supreme Court excused an alleged copyright infringer on the
grounds of. fair use even though the copyrighted work was unpublished. See Estate of Hem-
ingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462, 470, 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 60 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), afl'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969); see also Diamond v. Am-
Law Publishing Corp., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,627 (S.D.N.Y.). But see Study
No. 29, supra note 32, at n.32 (fair use doctrine not applicable to works protected at com-
mon law); H. BALL, supra note 1, at 260 n.5 (fair use inapplicable to unpublished works). A
question remains over the applicability of the doctrine to unpublished works even after the
1976 Act. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Mr. Goodale wrote:
Since the common law copyright is merged under the new act and since the
new act permits copying, then it would appear that the old doctrine that there can
be no fair use in a common law copyright is gone because the statute clearly says
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plated by Congress and runs contrary to objectives underlying the
copyright system as a whole."1
Section 107 of the Act is a codification of the common law that
lists the factors frequently employed by courts in determining fair
use.42 Congress expressly recognized the need for courts to apply
the section flexibly and did not intend to restrict fair use analysis
to the enumerated criteria.43
that there can be such fair use. Or does it?
Goodale, supra note 7, at 23, col. 2. Thus assuming an unpublished work is copied in a
"reasonable manner" as determined by the fair use criteria, the author may suffer monetary
damages for which the copyright laws offer no redress. Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at
377. The extent of an author's prepublication interests include:
(1) a possessory interest-the property interest in retaining physical possession
and ownership of the work itself; (2) a pecuniary interest-the preservation of the
value of the author's work and the identification of his name with the work; and
(3) a privacy interest-the protection of the privacy of the work until and if the
author decides that it be made public.
Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at 365.
41 Failing to distinguish between published and unpublished works in applying fair use,
it is suggested, both preempts "equivalent" remedies and implicitly disposes of certain
nonequivalent, common law rights. Such a result is contrary to explicit statutory language.
See supra note 38. Professor Nimmer argued that the court improperly disposed of the state
conversion claim in Harper & Row. See 1 M. NmmER, supra note 5, § 1.01[B], at 114.3 n.51.
42 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws,
at 5680. The fair use statute "is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." Id.; see Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1980); Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Ray. 497, 499, 510 (1977). The
factors are listed in the statute by way of example as the phrase "the factors to be consid-
ered shall include" indicates. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1980). Section 101 defines "including" as
"illustrative and not limiting." Id.; see 3 M. NuamFR, supra note 5, § 13.05[A], at 13-56 n.15.
One commentator has listed as many as eight pertinent factors to be considered including:
(1) the type of use involved; (2) the intent with which it was made; (3) its effect on
the original work; (4) the amount of the user's labor involved; (5) the benefit
gained by him; (6) the nature of the works involved; (7) the amount of material
used and; (8) its relative value.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 53.
43 See House REPORT, supra note 4, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws. at 5680. Congress had "no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute" and
hoped that the courts adopted the doctrine "to the particular situations on a case by case
basis." Id. Thus, the statute was designed to aid the courts in applying the doctrine as well
as to provide a general guide for users. See id.; L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 18. Statutory
assistance was deemed necessary since the fair use doctrine had been labeled "the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright," Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661,
662 (2d Cir. 1939), and possibly "one of the most difficult questions which can well arise for
judicial consideration," Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 59 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
See Cohen, supra note 4, at 52-53. Specifically, courts have had difficulty in distinguishing
whether the copier's use is an excusable infringement or whether the material falls outside
the realm of copyright. See Study No. 14, supra note 4, at 6; Cohen, supra note 4, at 47-48.
Professor Nimmer urged that the doctrine of fair use should operate as an affirmative de-
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The fair use doctrine was justified at common law by the
fiction that the copyright owner implicitly consented to reasonable
uses upon publication. 44 A corollary to this theory is that reasona-
ble use is sanctioned by custom upon publication. 41 These ratio-
fense. 3 M. NnaraR, supra note 5, 13.05[A], at 13-56; see H. BALL, supra note 1, at 26 (fair
use is "technically an infringement").
The statute has been viewed as a potential impediment to further judicial development
of fair use criteria. See Rosenfield, Customary Use as "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 25
BUFFALO L. Rxv. 119, 119 (1975). Prior to the statute, courts were more "unpredictable" and
did not systematically use criteria such as those listed in § 107. Hayes, Classroom "Fair
Use": A Reevaluation, 26 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 101, 117-19 (1978). In fact, one commenta-
tor predicted that § 107 would destroy "vitality [of the fair use doctrine] and its ability to
accommodate itself to all conditions and to those as yet unseen." Copyrights Act: Hearings
on H.R. 4347 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., sec. 8, pt. 3 at 1706 (statement by John Schulman); see Schulman, Fair Use Act, 53
IOWA L. REv. 838 (1968); Note, supra note 5, at 90; see also Comments and Views Submit-
ted to the Copyright and the Revision of the Copyright Office on Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works, Study No. 14 in COPYRIGHT LAW REvisION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COM-
mrrrEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1958) (fair use concept more workable
if left to the courts).
Conversely, one critic of the statute argued that it fails to define fair use specifically
and fails to order the delineated criteria in terms of priority. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 19;
see Hayes, supra, at 118. Indeed, it has been suggested that the statute should specify the
quantity and types of work that may be copied in order to assist the courts in interpreting
the "vague and obscure language." Rubin, Some Thoughts on the "Fair Use" Doctrine
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 59 CHI. B. REc. 24, 29 (1977). Lastly, one author con-
cluded that codification of the doctrine has not resulted in a more careful fair use analysis
by the courts. Leavens, supra note 5, at 10.
44 See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir.
1905) (republication of city directory constitutes infringement since no "implied" or "com-
mon consent" can be found as in the arts and sciences); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (burlesque motion picture not within fields
of "art" where consent implied from copyright holder), afl'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Karl v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (owner of copyrighted song
dedicated to professional football team consented "by implication" to others' reasonable
uses); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa.
1938) (no implied consent where copier's use is purely commercial). Implied consent to some
degree of use should be recognized since the author has engaged in a "figurative bargain" to
gain statutory protection. Study No. 14, supra note 4, at 7. It has been suggested, however,
that this theory no longer applies because unpublished works are now afforded statutory
protection. See Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at 369 n.95. In addition, the implied
consent theory has been questioned since authors place restrictive legends on their works
that prohibit copying "in whole or in part, but nevertheless gain no greater protection." 3
M. NniaR, supra note 5, § 13.05, at 13-55; see Study No. 14, supra note 4, at 7. But see
Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 214 (1954) (author's restrictive legend
cannot affect judicial determination of what taking is fair). Nevertheless, it has been sug-
gested that the best summary of the fair use test is whether a reasonable copyright owner
would have consented to the use. Study No. 14, supra note 4, at 15.
45 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966) (customary for biographers to extract material from earlier accounts), cert. denied,
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nales, however, clearly do not justify the application of the doc-
trine before the implied act of consent-publication-has
occurred. 46 In addition, the period just prior to publication is cru-
cial in determining the financial success of a written work T.4 There-
fore, it is submitted that a high degree of copyright protection is
required immediately before publication to preserve the author's
economic incentives to publish.
Reconciling Copyrights and the First Amendment
The earliest copyright laws were little more than crude at-
tempts at censorship."8 More recently, courts applying these laws
have better accommodated the public's first amendment interest in
free access to information.49 The fair use doctrine and the idea/
expression dichotomy"0 are means by which courts attempt to bal-
385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D.
Cal. 1963) (although customary to rely on prior works, copying of manner and style imper-
missible); Case Note, Copyrights-"Fair Use", 15 S. CAL. L. Ray. 249, 250 (1942) (implied
consent to reasonable use may promote science and the arts). When it is customary to use
copyrighted material for a non-profit educational purpose, the use is deemed fair per se.
See, e.g., William & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. CL 1973), affld
mem. by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Rosenfield, supra note 43, at 119; cf.
17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982) (special exemption for libraries).
46 It is submitted that it is logically impossible to imply consent to use of a copyrighted
work that has been purloined. In addition, it cannot be contended that The Nation acted
customarily since there exists "a degree of trust in the publishing business" that honors the
confidence of unpublished manuscripts. Appellee's Answering Brief at 35.
7 See Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at 366-67. Confidence within the publishing
industry that manuscripts will not be revealed prematurely "promotes the exploitation of
subsidiary rights, and enhances public access to the copyrighted work." Appellee's Answer-
ing Brief at 35.
4, See supra note 1.
' See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The public's right to be informed is a rec-
ognized interest derived from the first amendment. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Meiklejoha, The First
Amendment is Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 245, 255-62. It is this right to know and not the
speaker's interest that is of prime concern, see A. MKanuaiom, FREE SPEECH AND rrs RELA-
TION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 102-03 (1948), since one does not "engage in self-expression in
any meaningful sense" by appropriating the expression of another. I M. NiMMER, supra note
5, at § 1.10[B][2], at 1-76. This is true even if the expression is one's own but the copyright
interest has been sold to another. Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80 See Wainwright See., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). The Wainwright Securities court noted that:
What is protected is the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpreta-
tion of events, the way he structures his material and marshals facts, his choice of
words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments. Thus, the essence of
infringement lies not in taking a general theme or in coverage of the reports as
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ance this public interest against an author's legitimate need to pro-
tect the embodiment of his expression. 1 Indeed, it is generally ac-
cepted that a proper fair use analysis will avoid most first
amendment confrontations 52 and that a copyright holder's inter-
ests should be subordinated only when the material is of value
solely in its original form. 3 Yet, those instances in which the au-
thor's ideas are truly "wedded" to his expression are rare and usu-
ally involve graphic works.5 4 In these cases, first amendment inter-
events, but in appropriating the "particular expression through similarities of
treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization."
Id. (quoting Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). This is the idea/expression dichotomy, see 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 5, § 1.10[B], at 1-72, that is codified in the copyright laws, see 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
See also HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5670. The dichotomy is based on the theory that "information does not owe its
origin to the author," and therefore the authorship requirement for copyright protection is
not met. Denicola, Copyright in Collection of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfic-
tion Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 525 (1981).
51 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). The balance sought by the idea/expression dichotomy was
recognized with approval by Nimmer when he wrote:
On the whole ... it appears that the idea-expression line represents an ac-
ceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free speech interests. In
some degree it encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to
reproduce the "expression" of others, but this is justified by the greater public
good in the copyright encouragement of creative works. In some degree it en-
croaches upon the author's right to control his works in that it renders his "ideas"
per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater public need for free access
to ideas as a part of the democratic dialogue.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[B], at 1-76. The copyright law also accommodates free
speech interests by the limited duration of copyright protection, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982)
(life of author plus 50 years), the requirement of authorship, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) and the government work exemption. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982). See
Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. Rv. 320, 322-24
(1979). See generally Goldstein, supra note 31, at 1006-35 (analysis of ways in which laws
balance copyright monopoly and the public's access to information).
52 See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171,
1178 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'g on other grounds, 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Dallas Cow-
boys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979). In Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978), however, the court noted that "legitimate in depth
news coverage of copyrighted, small-circulation articles dealing with areas of general con-
cern may require courts to distinguish between the doctrine of fair use and 'an emerging
constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the first amendment."' Id. at 95 (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Nimmer, supra note 31, at 1200); see supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text.
53 See Note, Copyright Law-One Step Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Public Interest
Qualification Premised on the First Amendment, 57 N.C.L. Rav. 150, 160 (1978).
" 1 M. NmmxR, supra note 5, § 1.10[C], at 1-82. For most graphic works, Nimmer
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ests are implicated. 5 In Harper & Row, therefore, even if the exact
expression of President Ford constituted the only "news" in the
manuscript,"' holding that The Nation's use was protected inde-
pendently by the first amendment would have been preferable to
distorting the fair use doctrine in an effort to apply a traditional
copyright analysis.57
Moreover, it is suggested that in emphasizing the public's
favors copyright protection. Id. at 1-84. However, when a news photograph is involved, such
as photos of the My Lai massacre, copyright interests must be subordinated. Id. One com-
mentator has suggested that in circumstances in which the author's expression must be
used, compensatory or statutory damages should be awarded. Note, supra note 52, at 335.
An alternative suggestion envisions some form of compulsory licensing. See 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 5, § 1.10[D], at 1-92. It should be noted, however, that the first amendment may
bar injunctive relief normally available under the copyright laws. Note, supra note 51, at
339.
"See Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 (1983) (fair use liberally applied if quotation needed for accurate reporting);
Brittin, Constitutional Fair Use, 28 CoPYaIGrr L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 141, 187 (1982); see also
Cambell, Copyright and News Values: An Accommodation, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS-
CAP) 121, 154 (1980) (paraphrasing newsworthy literary material may be inadequate to con-
vey "tone and meaning"). Nimmer noted that such a contention may have been possible in
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 1 M.
NimMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[D], at 1-90 n.82. In Meeropol, the Second Circuit held that
verbatim copying of letters written by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was not fair use. 560 F.2d
at 1070. The holding indicated that the "additional speech value" should be outweighed by
the copyright holder's interest. 1 M. NmmER, supra note 5, § 1.10[D], at 1-90 n.82. But see
Brittin, supra, at 185.
" See supra note 25 and accompanying text. It is suggested that in Harper & Row, that
The Nation could have reported the information without appropriating any of President
Ford's own expression. See 1 M. Nnnm, supra note 5, § 1.10 [D], at 1-88. Several scholars,
in addition to Nimmer, have criticized Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), because it did not involve con-
veying information that was inextricably related to the expression taken. See L. SELTzER,
supra note 5, at 42-43; Denicola, supra note 31, at 294-95; see also Sid & Marty Kroft
Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1171 n.17 (9th Cir. 1977). The benefits
derived from the preservation of an author's economic incentive more than compensate for
the substance lost by having to replace his original expression. 1 M. NmamE, supra note 5, §
1.10[B], at 1-75.
57 The fair use doctrine will become "disfigured" and ultimately will fail to fulfill its
traditional role if it is to effect first amendment interests. Denicola, supra note 31, at 316;
see Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 84
COLUM. L. Rav. 425, 457 (1984) (fair use manipulation satisfies neither first amendment nor
copyright interests). The failure to distinguish the first amendment from the fair use con-
cept poses a "grave danger" to the copyright system. 1 M. Nnane., supra note 5, § 1.10 [D],
at 1-86.1; see Sobel, supra note 31, at 79-80 (unfair uses become acceptable when swayed by
"public interest" factor). Several commentators have expressed the need for an independent
first amendment privilege. See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 31, at 79-80; Rosenfield, The Ameri-
can Constitution, Free Inquiry, and the Law, in FAIR UsE AD FREE INQUiRY 288, 302-03
(1980) (fair use based on both first and ninth amendments); Note supra note 53, at 162-63.
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right of access to the appropriated information," the Harper &
Row court unnecessarily subordinated the copyright holder's inter-
ests. As Judge Meskill explained, the public would have had access
to the information regardless of The Nation article." This conten-
tion could validly be made in almost all cases in which copyrighted
work is near publication. 0 In short, it is suggested that a predomi-
nant first amendment rationale for subordinating a copyright
holder's interests is not truly implicated when there is some relia-
ble indication that the work in question is on the verge of
publication. 1
Copyright protection is, in fact, designed to ensure dissemina-
tion by encouraging publication. 2 If this goal is to be realized, it is
imperative that authors who are about to publish are afforded ade-
quate protection; this is true regardless of the level of public inter-
est in the material.6 3 To relax the level of protection afforded
88 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69 723 F.2d at 216-17 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
60 It is conceded that situations may arise in which it is important that the material be
revealed prior to the author's release. However, such extraordinary circumstances were not
shown in Harper & Row. Therefore, The Nation contributed nothing to the public dialogue
by destroying the serialization rights of Time. Professor Denicola has written:
The public benefit derived from the use diminishes significantly ... in those in-
stances in which the defendant has added little or nothing to the plaintiff's contri-
bution. The extent of the independent research conducted by the defendant has
thus received consistent attention, even in decisions purportedly based on the
complete exclusion of factual material from the scope of copyright.
Denicola, supra note 31, at 538; see also 1 M. NinMAE, supra note 5, § 1.1O[D], at 1-90 (no
constitutional justification for copying "expression along with idea"). The Harper & Row
court rejected the contribution theory because the "essence" of news reporting is merely to
recount information. 723 F.2d at 207. News reporting in itself may be considered a produc-
tive use of copyrighted material, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. -
U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), but it is the creative use, not the
wider distribution of copyrighted material, that is the reason for the fair use doctrine, Pa-
cific and S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
6' The fact that the material in Harper & Row was about to be published should distin-
guish the case from one where the copyright owner actively seeks to prevent the publication
of the copyrighted material. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff could not prevent publication of biography which
"ought to be available to a reading public"). It is suggested that the Rosemont analysis is
not applicable to the circumstances of Harper & Row.
' See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See Denicola, supra note 31, at 313 (inherent danger in considering public impor-
tance as a factor in judicial determination of scope of first amendment privileges); Sobel,
supra note 31, at 77-78 ("definitional" rather than "ad hoc" approach); see also Iowa State
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)
(fair use does not permit "theft" of expression whenever "work contains material of possible
public importance"); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (rejecting ad
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works prior to publication because of their great interest to the
public would be to adopt the anomalous approach of affording the
least incentive to produce material that is of the most interest to
the public.6 4 It is submitted that this anomaly can be avoided, and
the constitutional objectives of the copyright system realized, only
by adjusting the fair use analysis in cases like Harper & Row in
which the material is in a soon-to-be-published state.
NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS IN THE FAIR USE CRITERIA
The first fair use factor listed in section 107 of the Copyrights
Act is the purpose and character of the copier's use. 5 Although it
hoc approach of weighing public interest in allegedly libelous material). In a case decided
after Harper & Row, however, the Second Circuit observed that the fair use doctrine should
be applied liberally in matters of high public concern. See Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp, 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983).
" Sobel, supra note 31, at 76. The fair use cases decided on the public interest factor
"do violence to the whole notion of copyright protection." Id. The long term goals of the
copyright system should outweigh the public's immediate desire in "unfettered access to
worthwhile literary material." Id. at 79.
65 17 U.S.C. § 107(i) (1982); see supra note 6. A finding that the use is either commer-
cial or of a nonprofit, educational character is not conclusive in determining fair use, A.
LATMAN, supra note 1, at 212, nor does a "noncommercial motive" necessarily lead to a fair
use conclusion. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). Some of the types of uses that may
be permitted under the fair use doctrine are:
Quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment.
Quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or
classification of the author's observations.
Use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied.
Summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report.
Reproduction by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a damaged
copy.
Reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a
lesson.
Reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports.
Incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work
located at the scene of an event being reported.
REGis'raaS REPORT, supra note 40, at 24. Traditionally, courts have evaluated "whether the
paraphrasing and copying was done in good faith or with evasive motives" in order to deter-
mine a user's purpose. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Roy
Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146-47 (1980)); see also
Wainwright Securities, 558 F.2d at 96 (self-serving intent of publisher a factor). Investigat-
ing the intent of the user is important since the fair use doctrine presupposes good faith and
fair dealing. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denial of use and acquisition of material by misrepresentation violates "in-
dustry standards of ethical behavior"), a'fld, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982); cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (state trade
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is recognized that news reporting is a legitimate fair use purpose, it
is suggested that the propriety of an alleged news reporting pur-
pose should be more carefully scrutinized when the user knows
that the copyrighted material is about to be published in its en-
tirety by the author.
The second factor listed in section 107 is "the nature of the
copyrighted work." 6 Guided by this requirement, the Harper &
Row court looked to the type of material contained within the
memoirs and characterized it as primarily factual in nature.6 7 Nev-
ertheless, an article's factual nature should not excuse a verbatim
copying, since the idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law pro-
tects the manner in which facts are expressed, and not the infor-
mation contained in the work."8 It is submitted that in determining
the nature of the work, the court's main consideration should have
been the stage of publication, rather than the work's content."9
The third factor codified in the statute is "the amount and
substantiality" of the material used relative to the copyrighted
work.70 However, when the infringing work relies almost exclu-
secret laws, by prohibiting the misappropriation of trade secrets, maintain "standards of
commercial ethics" since the "'necessity of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very
life and spirit of the commercial world' ") (citations omitted).
66 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
617 723 F.2d at 208. Due to the factual nature of the manuscript, the court determined
that it deserved only "narrow" protection. Id. (citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980)). However, the "factual nature determination" has
bearing only on the issue of copyrightability, not on the amounts to be deemed fair. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
68 See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918);
Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Roy Export Co. Estab. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F.
Supp. 1137, 1143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982); see supra note 52.
"I One commentator has written that "the fact that the work is unpublished would be a
factor, albeit not the only one, in determining whether the particular use of the work was a
'fair' one." Unpublished Works, supra note 7, at 377. Evaluating the work in terms of its
stage of publication would correspond to Professor Latman's view that analysis of the copy-
righted work "appears to be closely related to the implied consent theory." A. LATmAN,
supra note 1, at 213; see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. The district court men-
tioned the "soon to be published" state of the manuscript as a relevant fair use factor. 557
F. Supp. at 1072.
70 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982). Traditionally, "wholesale copying" could never be fair use,
Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937) (dictum), and
today such a proposition is evidenced by the term "portion" in § 107. A. LATMAN, supra note
1, at 213. But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. CL
1973) (proposition that wholesale copying is never fair use is an "overbroad generalization"),
afrd mem. by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
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sively upon the copyrighted material, a more important factor to
consider is the amount copied in relation to the defendant's own
work.7 1 This analysis requires weighing the relative value of the
copied material with respect to both the copyrighted and allegedly
infringing work.72 This relative value approach, which was used by
the district court,73 is preferable because it reflects the equitable
nature of the fair use doctrine.7 4 It is submitted that this approach
should have led the Harper & Row court to conclude that the
amount taken was excessive, particularly in view of the unpub-
lished state of the copyrighted work. 5
The fourth factor enumerated in the statute is the potential
for economic harm."s Proof of actual economic harm need not be
shown to overcome a fair use defense. 7 To impose that burden
71 See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (three lines from science book representing one twentieth of defendant's
pamphlet could not be deemed insubstantial). The copied material may be half of the new
work but only one-thousandth of the copyrighted material. Cohen, supra note 4, at 68. In
Harper & Row, the defendant extracted 83% of a three page article from a 655 page manu-
script. 723 F.2d at 198.
72 Carr v. National Capital Press, Inc., 71 F.2d 220, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Study No. 14, supra note 4, at 16.
71 See 557 F. Supp. at 1072. In the opinion below, Judge Owen wrote that "The Nation
took what was essentially the heart of the book." Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit noted
that the copyrighted amount taken in relation to the new work, 300 words in a 2250 word
article, was "insubstantial." See 723 F.2d at 208.
74 See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (fair
use doctrine is "entirely equitable").
78 One commentator has suggested that "the amount of paraphrasing or quotation of an
unpublished work should be substantially less than that permitted of a published work"
Goodale, supra note 7, at 23, col. 3. This suggestion is based on the idea that the theories of
privacy and consent--"whch underlie the theory of copyright under common law, would
... still be relevant to a prepublication copyright under the new statute of 1976." Id. Such
an opinion is in accordance with the Senate Judiciary Committee's view:
The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited
since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on
the part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances the copyright own-
er's "right of first publication" would outweigh any needs of reproduction for
classroom purposes.
S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1975); see Note, Personal Letters: A Dilemma for
Copyright and Privacy Law, 33 RuTGERs L. REv. 134, 148-49 (1980) (legislative history sug-
gests intention to have fair use applied restrictively to unpublished works).
76 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982). Professor Nimmer believes the courts view this factor as
the most important, 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 5, § 13.05[A], at 1365, yet he notes that some
courts view this factor improperly "as merely raising the question of the extent of damages,"
id.; see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
77 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 793 (1984). In a
recent fair use decision, Justice Stevens wrote: "Actual present harm need not be shown;
such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable
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would be inconsistent with the presumption of statutory damages
set forth in the copyright laws. 78 Furthermore, the speculative na-
ture of copyright damages caused by the infringement of a work
prior to publication makes it unreasonable to require proof of ac-
tual damages.7 9 Therefore, the Harper & Row court's determina-
tion that proof of economic harm was "dubious at best"80 seems
unrealistic.
In limiting its analysis to statutory factors, the Second Circuit
in Harper & Row provided ammunition for those who argue that
the codification of the fair use doctrine would curtail its judicial
development."1 A more complete evaluation of all relevant factors
does not support the court's fair use determination.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in Harper & Row denied proper copyright
protection by failing to acknowledge the peculiar needs of a copy-
right holder prior to publication. This oversight has produced a
precedent that is inconsistent both with the purpose of the copy-
right laws and the doctrine of fair use. The Harper & Row court
should have granted the necessary protection by a proper adjust-
ment of the traditional fair use analysis. It is submitted that, by
permitting first amendment considerations to dominate its fair use
analysis, the court improperly concluded that the borrowed expres-
sion was minimal.82 The court's approach minimizes the impor-
damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result." Id.; see
Leavens, supra note 5, at 8. But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (fair use found since defendant's copying not shown to cause financial
harm), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
11 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982). The Copyright Act of 1976 provides for statutory damages
from $250 up to $10,000 "as the court considers just." Id. An infringement does not depend
on harm to the plaintiff, and all of the statutory copyright remedies are based upon in-
fringement, rather than harm. Leavens, supra note 5, at 9; see 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982) (in-
junction); id. § 503 (destruction of infringing copies); id. § 505 (recovery of costs). Statutory
remedies are based on the notion that any infringement, "however nominal, causes harm to
a copyright holder." Leavens, supra note 5, at 8; see DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,
696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
'" Leavens, supra note 5, at 9. One commentator has noted that reliance on the poten-
tial economic effect factor "ignores ... non-economic harms" that "may cause disincentives
greater than pecuniary loss." Id. These latter interests become most evident when an au-
thor's prepublication interests are invaded. Id. at 910; see supra note 39.
80 723 F.2d at 208. The court contended that the plaintiff's evidence failed to show that
Time rescinded wholly because of "the very limited use of expression per se." Id.
81 See supra note 43.
82 It is submitted that the ideals of the first amendment are fostered by protecting a
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tance of the copyright laws.83 While the first amendment may well
suggest an appropriate defense to a copyright infringement charge
under certain circumstances, first amendment arguments should
not be indiscriminately incorporated into a fair use analysis with-
out considering that the copyrighted work is on the verge of publi-
cation. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will not adopt the Sec-
ond Circuit's fair use analysis since "the interests of all-authors,
publishers and the public-are best served by the maintenance of
a sound system of copyright protection for all literary mate-
rial-even that which is in the public interest. 8 4
Joseph R. Re
publisher's serialization rights. That is, without assurance that a manuscript will be ade-
quately protected, authors will be loath to distribute their manuscripts for publication in
serial form.
" See Margolick, The Nation Ruling: News and the Public Domain, N.Y. Times, Nov.
18, 1983 at B4, col 6. The Harper & Row decision appears to weaken copyright laws to the
point that authors will be left with insufficient protection unless they secure their manu-
scripts under lock and key. Id.
8 Sobel, supra note 31, at 78.
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